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While the literature on business power and global finance has illuminated the ways 
in which financial institutions limit the policy autonomy of states in developing 
countries, we know much less about the circumstances under which the power of 
financiers is undermined. In this article I advance explanations of these 
circumstances by arguing that state access to natural resource revenues reduces the 
power of financial institutions and enhances the capacity of the state to pursue 
central bank policies which violate the interests of major financiers. I employ a case 
study of central bank policy in Nigeria to probe this argument and find evidence 
that supports the claim that whenever the Nigerian government’s access to resource 
revenues increased, the state’s capacity to diverge from financiers’ preferred central 
bank policies and to advance its own preferences increased as well. The analysis 
provides the basis for broader propositions about the policy space of developing 
countries vis-à-vis financial institutions and the variability of structural power. 





A significant body of literature on business power and global finance has examined the 
influence of financial institutions over policy choices in developing countries. This literature 
has illuminated how financial institutions may, due to their ability to withdraw much needed 
capital, reduce the policy autonomy of governments and encourage a policy stance that reflects 
the interests of financiers.1 However, there is much less knowledge about the circumstances 
under which the power of financiers is undermined, even though this happens quite often. These 
circumstances are the subject of this article.  
I argue that state access to natural resource revenues reduces the structural power of financial 
institutions and, as a result, enhances the capacity of the state to diverge from financiers’ 
preferred policies and to advance its own policy preferences.2 My argument has its roots in 
scholarship on structural power, which examines how groups that control investible resources 
shape policy. Specifically, this article builds on the claim of Jeffrey Winters (1994, 1996) that 
the influence business has over policy decreases as states’ access to investible resources that 
can replace privately controlled resources increases.  
I illustrate my argument with a case study of central bank policy in Nigeria, a major oil-
exporting developing country. An analysis of central bank policy is well suited to examine the 
power relationship between states and financiers such as private banks and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) because it is an area of concern for both groups. For states central bank 
policy shapes variables which determine a country’s economic prosperity, such as price and 
financial stability or access to credit. For financial institutions central bank policy shapes a 
country’s investment climate and creditworthiness.  
My analysis shows that when the Nigerian state had a low level of resource revenues, the state 
felt pressures to be responsive to the preferences of financiers for a central bank policy stance 
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that prioritised stability because it relied on these financiers for the provision of investment 
resources. Yet as the resource revenues of the state increased, the reliance on financiers 
decreased. As a result, there was an increase in the capacity of the state to diverge from 
financiers’ preferred policies and to advance its preferences for central bank policies that 
prioritised an expansion of access to finance. 
The contribution of this article is twofold. First, the article makes a theoretical contribution by 
combining insights from the literature on structural power and on resource dependent 
developing countries. Theories of structural power are most helpful in predicting the direction 
of policy when the power of investors is high. Winters (1996, p. 141), for instance, argues that 
when ‘the structural leverage of investors is effectively blocked (…) one can account for the 
direction of policy changes only by looking at contextual factors that vary widely from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction’. I contend that by bringing in arguments derived from the literature 
on the politics of resource dependence, it is also possible to account for the direction of policy 
when the power of financiers is undermined. Moreover, my findings bear important theoretical 
implications for understanding the politics of economic policymaking in resource dependent 
developing countries by pointing to structural power as the causal mechanism linking state 
access to resource revenues and the capacity of the state to employ expansionary policy. 
The second contribution is empirical. Recent work on structural power has improved our 
understanding of the independent variables shaping the structural power of financial institutions 
(Culpepper and Reinke 2014, Bell and Hindmoor 2015, James and Quaglia 2018). Yet few 
researchers have examined the conditions under which the power of financiers is blocked in 
developing countries, even though their power is likely to be particularly high in capital-poor 
countries (Mosley 2005). Even fewer scholars have examined Winters’ claim that state access 
to investible resources that can replace privately controlled resources can mediate business 
power. Nigeria’s story adds some empirical ‘meat’ to this claim.  
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The next section combines arguments about structural power and the politics of resource 
dependence to develop an explanation of how state access to resource revenues may enhance 
the capacity of the state to diverge from financiers’ preferred policies. Section 3 introduces the 
research approach and Section 4 presents a historical narrative of central bank policy in Nigeria. 
Section 5 highlights the implications of the findings for our understanding of the power 
relationships between states in developing countries and financiers. 
Power and Resource Dependence 
Many scholars invoke the hypothesis that the control of financial institutions over financial 
resources, which allows them to withhold or relocate capital, exerts strong pressures on 
governments to pursue policies which reflect the interests of these financiers and subordinate 
their own interests. In demonstrating this claim, scholarship on developed countries tends to 
focus on the power of private financiers such as banks.3 Scholarship on developing countries, 
in contrast, tends to focus on the influence of public financiers, notably the IMF, because many 
developing countries rely to a significant extent on external financial assistance.4  
Even though scholarship has highlighted that financiers do not always win political battles 
(Maxfield 1990, Culpepper and Reinke 2014, Pagliari and Young 2014, Gallagher 2015), 
research examining the circumstances under which the capacity of the state to diverge from 
financiers’ preferred policies increases is rare. Much of the existing research seeking to 
understand these circumstances falls into one of three broad categories. The first category of 
explanations suggests that distress in financial institutions reduces their ability to shape policy 
(Maxfield 1994). The second category suggests that ideas government officials hold may 
decrease the perceived threat that financiers withdraw financing and thereby mediate financiers’ 
powers (Bell 2005, 2012, Bell and Hindmoor 2014). A third category of explanations, which 
seeks to account for failures of the IMF and the World Bank to shape policy in developing 
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countries, argues that the conditionality of these institutions has often been ineffective because 
they were unwilling to withdraw funds if conditions were not met (Killick 1997, Stone 2004). 
I provide an additional explanation, namely that state access to natural resource revenues may 
limit the power of private banks and the IMF as major financial institutions. Specifically, I 
argue that when a state has a low level of resource revenues, its capacity to diverge from 
financiers’ preferred central bank policy stance is limited and the state has strong incentives to 
employ a policy stance that reflects the preferences of major financiers. As the resource 
revenues of a state increase, the state’s dependence on financial institutions decreases, 
enhancing the government’s capacity to diverge from financiers’ preferred central bank policy 
stance and to advance its own policy preferences. This argument has its roots in scholarship on 
structural power and extends this literature by highlighting resource revenues as a factor that 
shapes the variability of such power.  
Structural power and central bank policy 
The literature on the structural power of capital provides a set of propositions why and how 
financiers should be able to exercise power over policy in a context of low resource revenues. 
This literature suggests that structural power arises from the dependence of states on private 
sector agents to invest in a way that allows for the maintenance of  the level of economic activity 
necessary to finance the state apparatus and to sustain the popular support needed for staying 
in power (Block 1977, Lindblom 1977). Private sector agents respond to policy by changing 
their investment decisions in accordance with their own individual profit-maximizing 
objectives. Consequently, governments feel strong pressures to implement policies which are 
responsive to the interests of the private sector.  
Issues of anticipation and perception are critical for the operation of structural power (Hay and 
Rosamond 2002, Bell and Hindmoor 2014, Fairfield 2015). Policymakers reform policy when 
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they perceive it to have negative effects on investment to improve the ‘investment climate’. 
Moreover, the mere anticipation of a downturn in investment following a policy which is not in 
the interest of business may be sufficient for policymakers to rule out the policy. Structural 
power is thus distinct from instrumental power, which shapes policy through political 
mobilization in the form of lobbying, participating in policymaking, financing campaigns, or 
marches (Fairfield 2011). 
The structural power of the financial sector has received considerable attention in the literature 
because it is assumed to be high compared to other sectors (Maxfield 1990, Winters 1994, Bell 
and Hindmoor 2017, pp. 104-5). Finance capital may be particularly powerful because it is 
highly mobile and can thus be easily withdrawn. Moreover, financial institutions sustain 
investment in the productive sectors and help to finance public investment.   
Much of the existing scholarship on financiers’ structural power focuses on the role of banks 
as major private financial institutions. Yet I extend the insights of the literature to encompass 
the role of the IMF, a major public international financial institution (IFI), because the IMF 
may gain significant influence over policy when private investment and the financial resources 
of the state decline (Winters 1996, Lukauskas and Minushkin 2000). Often the IMF exercises 
material power in a way that is non-structural, for instance by resorting to open coercion. There 
may however be circumstances when the IMF exercises material power in a structural manner, 
playing the role of a gatekeeper: States often make the provision of aid and debt relief 
conditional upon whether a country successfully participates in an IMF programme (Gould 
2003). Moreover, private investors often attach weight to the IMF’s assessments of economic 
policy in deciding about investment in developing countries. Thus, a government may pursue 
policies that are responsive to the concerns of the IMF in the belief that 1) the IMF reacts to 
policies deemed unfavourable by negatively assessing the performance of a programme or 
suspending it and 2) that states and private investors respond to the IMF’s reaction by 
7 
 
withholding funds. The IMF would then pose structural constraints on government policy. 
Therefore, in examining financiers’ power, I focus on private banks and the IMF as key 
financiers in developing countries. 
What central bank policy stance can we expect when a state depends on the IMF and banks as 
major financiers and capacity to diverge from their preferences is therefore limited? In 
specifying the central bank policy preferences of financiers, I focus on monetary and financial 
policy because they tend to be the main policy fields of developing country central banks. 
Financial policy notably includes prudential regulation to enhance financial stability and 
allocative policies targeting the expansion of access to credit for specified sectors. 
Both the IMF and private banks are likely to prefer a central bank policy stance that prioritises 
stability over the expansion of access to finance.5 In particular, the IMF has considered the 
orientation of monetary policy towards price stability and of financial policy towards financial 
stability as the primary tasks of central banks in developing countries (Guitian 1995, Babb 2003, 
Rodrik 2006, IEO 2007, Epstein 2013). Although private banks are a diverse group of actors 
the orientation of monetary policy towards price stability is a concern of most banks, domestic 
and foreign (Maxfield 1991, Posen 1996, Brownbridge et al. 1998, Kirshner 2001). While banks 
may be supportive of an expansionary monetary policy to the extent that their own real 
borrowing costs fall, they fear high and changing rates of inflation because they erode interest 
earnings. Given the negative impacts of unanticipated inflation on banks’ profitability, they are 
likely to prefer a central bank policy stance that prioritises price stability over the expansion of 
access to finance.  
As regards financial policy, private banks tend to prefer a central bank policy stance that 
emphasises prudential regulation over allocative policy. Banks certainly want to minimise 
prudential regulation, which restricts their borrowing and lending decisions (Maxfield 1990, 
Young 2012). Yet banks also want to enjoy central banks’ lender of last resort protection and 
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operate in a context of financial stability because the defaults, rising borrowing costs and bank 
runs associated with banking sector distress might reduce banks’ profits and damage their 
reputation among investors. Banks are thus likely to support an orientation of financial policy 
towards financial stability as long as the benefits arising from financial stability, such as 
enhanced creditworthiness in the eyes of investors and lender of last resort protection, are 
perceived to outweigh the costs of prudential regulation (Maxfield 1990, p. 25, Walter 2008, p. 
160, Jones and Zeitz 2017). Allocative policies, in contrast, tend to face opposition from 
bankers because such polices usually seek to enhance access to credit for sectors to which banks 
are unwilling to lend because they perceive other sectors as more profitable and creditworthy 
(Maxfield 1990, Brownbridge et al. 1998, Mwaniki 2017, Naqvi 2017).  
Resource revenues and central bank policy 
My argument that state access to natural resource revenues may limit the power of financial 
institutions builds on previous work on the structural power of capital by Jeffrey Winters. 
Winters (1994, 1996) claims that state access to financial resources that can replace those 
provided by private capital, so-called ‘replacement resources’, reduces the reliance on the 
private sector for the maintenance of the level of economic activity necessary to finance the 
state apparatus and sustain popular support, thus mediating the structural power of capital. 
Extending this claim to the realm of finance and natural resource dependence, I argue that an 
increase in a state’s resource revenues may undermine the power of financiers and, as a result, 
enhance the government’s capacity to diverge from financiers’ preferred policies and to 
advance its own policy preferences, which I refer to as policy space.  
The key point here relates to the pattern of capital control in resource-rich developing countries. 
In many of these countries governments control a large portion of the resource revenues because 
laws allocate the ownership of natural resources like petroleum to the state and the extractive 
sector is state-owned. If the extractive sector is in part or entirely privately-owned, governments 
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may gain control of resource revenues through royalties, corporate taxes or concession fees. 
During resource booms resource revenues may become large enough to replace a significant 
amount of private investment and financial assistance on which countries rely in normal times. 
As the reliance on financiers declines, not only does the fiscal space for expansionary policies 
increase, but the government’s political space for policies which diverge from financiers’ 
preferences such as directed credit does as well. 
Jeffrey Winters’s book on structural power in Indonesia, which also includes a brief case study 
of Nigeria, provides one of the few examples which explores the claim that the structural power 
of business decreases as states’ access to replacement resources increases (Winters 1996). 
However, it focuses on business in general rather than financiers and regarding Nigeria Winters 
finds that institutional incoherence and the weakness of Nigeria’s political opposition, rather 
than access to resource revenues, account for the Nigerian state’s unresponsiveness to business. 
A limitation of Winters’s case study of Nigeria is, however, that it does not systematically 
examine whether changes in the state’s resource revenues are associated with changes in policy. 
What central bank policy stance can we expect when governments in resource dependent 
developing countries have a high capacity to diverge from financiers’ preferences and advance 
their own preferences? Research on the politics of resource dependence suggests that these 
governments usually have a preference for a policy stance that supports economic expansion 
(Gelb 1988, Karl 1997, Kaufman 2011, Ross 2012).6 Extending these insights to the realm of 
central banking suggests that governments in resource-rich developing countries prefer 
monetary and financial policies that prioritise an expansion of access to finance over stability.7   
The literature highlights two main reasons for this preference. One is that an expansionary 
policy stance may enhance political support as it allows dispensing patronage to political rivals 
and constituencies (Ross 2001, 325-61, Robinson et al. 2006, Morrison 2009, : 107-38). 
Employing expansionary policy to gain political support may be particularly appealing for 
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governments in resource dependent developing countries because limited income opportunities 
increase the susceptibility of citizens to patronage. Another reason is that the very phenomenon 
of weak private sector development, a corollary of resource dependence, may provide 
incentives for expansionary economic policies, as they may help to develop and diversify the 
private sector (Karl 1997). Expanding the non-resource sectors is an important way to decrease 
the vulnerability to economic shocks arising from the volatility in the markets for natural 
resources like oil (Mazaheri 2014).  
Overall the foregoing discussion suggests that state access to resource revenues reduces the 
structural power of financial institutions and, as a result, enhances the capacity of the state to 
diverge from financiers’ preferred policies and to advance its own policy preferences. Table 1 
summarises the arguments in this section. Both the IMF and banks on balance favour a central 
bank policy stance that prioritises stability. The tightening of monetary policy or prudential 
regulation and lower emphasis on policies that reduce the costs of lending such as schemes that 
support the provision of credit at below-market interest rates are indications that a central bank 
prioritises stability (Mishra et al. 2012, Barajas et al. 2013, Sahay et al. 2015). Governments in 
resource dependent developing countries usually favour a central bank policy stance that 
prioritises the expansion of access to finance. Indications of such a stance are the loosening of 
monetary policy or prudential regulation and an increase in the emphasis placed on financial 
policies that reduce the costs of borrowing. The key point is that changes in resource revenues 
lead to changes in the ability of financiers and the government to enact their preferences. 
<Table 1 about here> 
Note that what is particular about my argument is not that resource dependent countries are 
likely to employ expansionary fiscal and monetary policy during resource booms, as has been 
demonstrated in the literature (Kaufman 2011). Neither do I claim here that the policy space 
governments gain during resource booms implies beneficial development outcomes. Whether 
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governments use their space to advance policies that diverge from financiers’ policy preferences 
in ways that improve development outcomes is likely to depend on various factors, including 
the existence of strategic alliances with non-resource exporters (Mosley 2017). I argue that by 
studying the consequences of the variation in states’ resource revenues for central bank policy 
we can improve our understanding of the conditions under which financiers’ structural power 
is undermined and the central bank policy options that can reasonably be considered expand to 
include expansionary, state-led policy. Diverging preferences among financiers and 
governments in resource dependent developing countries as well as financiers’ ability to 
withhold funds render central bank policy an important but understudied locus of political 
conflict in resource dependent developing countries.  
Probing the Power of Financiers 
I employ a historical narrative of central bank policy in Nigeria to examine the effect of resource 
revenues on state capacity to diverge from financiers’ central bank policy preferences. Nigeria 
was selected as a case for three reasons. First, Nigeria has a national rather than regional central 
bank, hence the ability of Nigeria’s policymakers to determine central bank policy at the 
national level. Second, the relative importance of resource revenues, which in 2000-2010 
amounted on average to 95 per cent of exports. Third, arguments based on the theory of the 
structural power of capital have rarely been applied to African countries even though many 
countries are extremely dependent on external finance and private investors and IFIs have 
championed a neoliberal capitalist model in Africa (Harrison 2010). 
In assessing the role of structural power, the analysis relies on primary data such as speeches 
and more than 50 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with central bankers, commercial 
bankers, donors and representatives from IFIs, and on secondary literature. The interviews were 
conducted during fieldwork in Abuja and Lagos between 22 October and 14 November 2010, 
17 January and 10 February 2012, and 8 and 22 September 2017.  While the primary data was 
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mainly collected to understand the constraints that financiers impose on policymakers and 
policymakers’ perceptions of these constraints, the secondary data served specially to ascertain 
the extent to which policy becomes responsive to financiers’ concerns during moments of 
financial vulnerability due to oil busts.8 
Given that multiple factors might account for changes in the capacity of the Nigerian state to 
diverge from financiers’ preferences, I focus on pendulous swings in key variables over time. 
Specifically, I examine whether changes in policy systematically follow changes in the power 
financiers have due to their control over investible resources which in turn follow changes in 
resource revenues. My expectation is that whenever the Nigerian state’s access to resource 
revenues declines, the responsiveness to financiers’ concerns increases and, as a result, central 
bank policy becomes oriented towards stability. Whenever the resource revenues of the 
Nigerian state rise, we should observe that the state’s responsiveness to financiers’ concerns 
decreases and as a result, central bank policy becomes oriented towards an expansion of access 
to finance.  
The Politics of Central Bank Policy in Nigeria 
The case study of Nigeria spans the years 1959, when the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) was 
established, to 2013. As Table 2 shows, I divide Nigeria’s story into five sections with the level 
of oil revenues being the main criterion for the division. This division allows to contrast periods 
of high and low oil revenues, and thus to examine the linkages between changes in resource 
revenues, the government’s capacity to diverge from financers’ central bank policy preferences 
and the stance of central bank policy. As we will see, Nigeria’s story provides support for the 
claim that state access to resource revenues may enhance the capacity of the state to diverge 
from financiers’ preferred central bank policies. As the resource revenues of the state increase, 
the state’s capacity to diverge from financiers’ preferences for a policy stance prioritising 
stability and to advance its preferences for an expansion of access to finance increases as well. 
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< Table 2 about here> 
Oil booms and state indifference, 1959-1981  
When Nigeria’s central bank was established in 1959 there was agreement that stability should 
not be compromised for political reasons (CBN 1979, p. 42). Yet pressure on the CBN to pursue 
expansionary policies soon mounted. A key source of such pressure was the government’s 
access to a vast amount of discretionary resources following the first oil boom. When oil prices 
quadrupled in 1973/1974, the public ownership of oil reserves and equity stakes in the oil 
industry allowed the Nigerian state to gain control of an enormous amount of financial resources 
as Figure 1 shows. By the mid-1970s, oil had moved to the centre of economic accumulation 
in Nigeria, accounting for 93 per cent of exports in 1977 (Karl 1997, p. 206) and an average of 
76 per cent of government revenues between 1975 and 1980 (CBN 1994b, pp. 97-8). 
<Figure 1 about here> 
What was the effect of access to a significant amount of investible resources on the Nigerian 
state? Faced with the task of reconstruction when the Biafran war ended in 1970 and 
expectations from citizens to rapidly deliver economic growth, the government embarked on a 
massive programme of oil-funded, state-led economic development. The CBN aligned its 
operations with the government’s stance, reflecting the government’s view that the role of the 
CBN was, in the words of finance minister Okotie-Eboh, to ‘establish conditions which will be 
most suitable for the implementation of Government's economic policy’ (1959 cited in Uche 
1997, p. 146). Specifically, central bank policy began to prioritise expanding access to finance 
for the government and the private sector. The CBN promoted access to credit for instance 
through its ownership and funding of public development banks. It also established in 1977 an 
agricultural finance department, which, for instance, administered credit guarantee schemes 
(CBN 1979, p. 147).  In addition, the CBN used financial regulation extensively for allocative, 
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rather than prudential purposes (Brownbridge 1998, p. 106). For instance, the 1969 Banking 
Decree failed to require banks to make provisions for non-performing loans but empowered the 
CBN to set sector-specific interest rate ceilings and lending quotas to encourage lending to 
development priority sectors such as agriculture. In addition, in 1977 the CBN issued regulation 
requiring banks to set up rural branches to deliver agricultural credit (World Bank 1983a, p. 
58).  
Although price stability was formally a primary goal of the CBN, it often resolved trade-offs 
between price stability and financial access in favour of the latter. In a publication the CBN 
(1979, p. 127) acknowledged: ‘In pursuit of the objective of fostering the growth of a sound 
financial system to mobilise adequate development-oriented finance, the CBN has been obliged 
to be less constraining on the credit operations of the banking system than it otherwise would 
have been’. Thus while the CBN controlled the structure of interest rates, it avoided increasing 
interest rates to tame inflation in the 1970s to limit public and private borrowing  costs (World 
Bank 1983a).  
At that time, many central banks in other developing countries also sought to expand access to 
finance because it was part of the predominant economic thinking that central banks may 
actively support development (Helleiner 2001, Beck et al. 2009). Yet what was different in 
Nigeria was the state’s control of sizable resource revenues. This control not only widened the 
fiscal space of the state, enhancing for instance the fiscal capacity to provide direct financing 
to the economy. Oil revenues also enhanced the government’s political space for expansionary 
policy by allowing the government to gain control of a significant share of Nigeria’s investible 
resources, thereby reducing its concerns that investment would decline if financiers’ 
preferences were dismissed.  
The banking sector illustrates these dynamics. In the mid-1970s, the state used its oil revenues 
to acquire controlling equity stakes in all foreign-owned banks and to set up state government 
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banks. From that time until the late 1980s public sector ownership became predominant in 
Nigeria’s banking system, allowing the state to govern banks in line with its preference to 
expand access to finance. Policymakers displayed indifference to the preferences of banking 
sector agents which favoured a limitation of CBN policy to the promotion of stability, notably 
the foreign shareholders of Nigeria’s four largest, formerly foreign-owned commercial banks. 
The CBN’s controls on interest rates, rural branching requirements, credit guidelines and loose 
monetary policy combined to reduce the profits of these banks (World Bank 1983a, 
Brownbridge 1998, pp. 109-10). Yet when banks complained about the costs of opening up 
rural branches, for instance, they received no redress from the state (Wallace 1983, p. 170). The 
government could afford to display limited sensitivity to the concerns of banks because of its 
control of capital. In fact, the government as a major shareholder used its powers to reinforce 
compliance with the CBN’s allocative regulation (Brownbridge 1998, p. 109). Upset about the 
impacts of CBN policies, foreign shareholders were left to seek to appoint conservative 
managers, who tried to limit the share of loans among assets (Brownbridge 1998, pp. 108-10).  
The political influence of public financiers, notably the IMF and the World Bank, was also 
limited because they provided only a small share of investible resources in Nigeria. Specifically, 
Nigeria had never sought IMF financing involving conditionality by the early 1980s. As soon 
as oil revenues increased, Nigerian leaders had been keen to reduce their reliance on foreign 
assistance because the accompanying conditionality was seen to reduce the policy space (Okolie 
1995, pp. 35-6, Herbst and Soludo 2001). As a member of the CBN’s monetary policy 
committee (MPC) reflects, the view emerging in Nigeria was: ‘We are not an IMF debtor 
country and are thus more free’ (Interview with MPC member, 4 February 2012). Given the 
limited reliance on the IMF, the World Bank and other donors until the mid-1980s, it is not 
surprising that Nigerian policymakers did not address criticisms of central bank policy such as 
the interest rate scheme, which the World Bank deemed ‘excessive’ (World Bank 1983a). 
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The government’s preference for expansionary policy became particularly evident when 
Nigeria experienced a second oil boom between 1979 and 1981. Government revenues 
increased by 31 per cent in 1979 and 21 per cent in 1980 (Karl 1997, p. 247). IFIs voiced 
warnings at the beginning of the boom that the government should limit inflationary pressures 
(World Bank 1979, pp. iii-iv). Nonetheless, monetary and financial policy became increasingly 
expansionary to finance an agenda of state-led growth and political patronage.  
Declining oil revenues and increasing responsiveness to financiers, 1981-1986 
The expansionary policy spurred by the second oil boom generated a full-blown crisis in 1982 
when the boom had turned to bust. Between 1981 and 1982 government revenues had declined 
by 19 per cent owing to falling oil prices. Fiscal deficits increased rapidly because Shehu 
Shagari’s civilian government failed to reduce expenditure. In 1982 government borrowing 
from the CBN and domestic banks expanded by 57 per cent and Nigeria withdrew its final 
entitlement from the IMF (Forrest 1986, p. 12). The Nigerian government also incurred 
significant international debt through syndicated bank loans. In sum, the state’s reliance on the 
IMF and private banks increased significantly.  
The government sought to contain the crisis with short-term measures such as increasing 
interest rates but was unable to regain control over the economy.  Investors responded with exit 
through capital flight (World Bank 1983b, p. 4, Forrest 1986, p. 13). International banks 
withheld capital in the face of the international debt crisis and Nigeria’s crisis. Lacking room 
to move, the government stepped up its efforts to stabilise the economy in 1983. Notably, the 
government began negotiations with the IMF because international banks blocked credit to most 
developing countries without an IMF seal of approval (Okolie 1995, p. 203). Showing greater 
responsiveness to some concerns of the IMF for macroeconomic stabilization helped Nigeria to 
secure refinancing agreements but the government was unable to agree with the IMF on a 
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programme because it feared a backlash from voters in the 1983 elections  (Forrest 1986, p. 13, 
Herbst and Soludo 2001, p. 661).  
Limited responsiveness to the policy concerns of the IMF and private financiers had devastating 
effects. Nigeria’s GDP contracted by 5 per cent in 1983. Moreover, while Shagari was re-
elected, he was soon overthrown in a military coup by General Muhammadu Buhari. Among 
the reasons given for the coup were the enduring economic crisis and widespread corruption 
(Herbst and Soludo 2001, pp. 661-2). The fall of Shagari’s administration in 1983 thus 
underscores the political instability which may arise when those controlling capital withhold 
their funds and the state has no replacement resources. 
Buhari’s regime sought to regain control over the economy and win the confidence of 
international creditors to reschedule existing and access new debt. He began a reform 
programme which combined monetary contraction,  fiscal retrenchment and tight import and 
exchange controls (Okogu 1986, Lewis 2009, p. 161). Buhari believed that Nigeria’s economic 
crisis could be solved by withstanding three years of austerity (Forrest 1986, p. 24). A Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP), which the IMF and the World Bank requested and which 
required more wide-ranging measures such as financial liberalization, could then be postponed. 
Although the regime made some progress in containing the fiscal deficit, the economy suffered 
from the austerity measures. In addition, efforts to reschedule debts were not successful because 
international creditors rejected rescheduling in the absence of an IMF programme (Forrest 
1986, p. 24). Moreover, due to the austerity measures, popular protests ensued, which were 
swiftly repressed. Divisions within the military about the use of repression and the lack of 
popular support for the government provoked a successful coup attempt in August 1985, led by 
General Ibrahim Babangida (Forrest 1986, p. 23).  
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By the time Babangida seized power, the pressure to be responsive to financiers by changing 
the orientation of policy had become overwhelming. Nigeria’s ratio of non-concessional debt 
to total exports serves as a relatively good measure of the pressure for reform because it 
indicates how much revenue government leaders had available in light of their almost complete 
dependence on oil export earnings for government revenue (Herbst and Soludo 2001, p. 650). 
As Figure 2 shows, this ratio was tremendously high in 1986. Another indication of the 
vulnerability to external pressure is the low level of oil revenues in 1986 (see Figure 1). 
Babangida’s military regime believed that tinkering at the margins and intensifying the austerity 
measures and import controls, as Shagari and Buhari had attempted, was not a viable option 
(Herbst and Soludo 2001, p. 650). Such measures had failed to reverse the economic decline 
and lacked the support of the IMF which Babangida’s regime considered necessary to begin 
debt rescheduling talks with foreign banks. The government believed that the only option it 
could realistically consider was to embark on an SAP that was supported by the World Bank 
and the IMF. As Idika Kalu, who was finance minister at that time stressed in a public debate, 
the question was not whether Nigeria should take an IMF loan and the accompanying 
conditionality but whether it could afford not to do so (Herbst and Soludo 2001, p. 666). In July 
1986 the government embarked on a SAP that was monitored by the IMF and promoted 
measures such as tightening monetary policy, removing credit allocation guidelines and raising 
interest rates (Federal Republic of Nigeria 1986).  
<Figure 2 about here> 
Failed structural adjustment in the context of rising oil revenues, 1986-1993  
A close look at monetary and financial policy illustrates that commitment to the SAP waned as 
oil revenues rose over time. Specifically, efforts to orient financial policy towards stability had 
limited success. While the CBN removed interest rate controls in 1986 and 1987, it reintroduced 
some controls in 1989 and 1991 (Herbst and Soludo 2001, p. 668). Credit allocation guidelines 
19 
 
were simplified but maintained and development financing schemes remained in place. 
Prudential regulation was tightened in 1991 but rarely enforced (Lewis and Stein 1997, p. 11, 
Brownbridge 1998, p. 121). The liberalisation of entry into the banking sector gave rise to a 
domestically owned, private banking sector but low entry requirements allowed financial 
instability to increase. 
Monetary policy was also very loose between 1991 and 1993. After its tightening in 1986 and 
1987, the CBN embarked on some reflationary measures following public protests in 1988 and 
1989 (Lewis and Stein 1997, p. 11). Between 1991 and 1993 the CBN’s advances to the 
government  increased by 359 per cent (CBN 1994a, p. 17). While the government increased 
the CBN’s autonomy from the ministry of finance in 1991, the formal strengthening of  
independence failed to orient CBN policy towards price stability because the government’s 
preferences for financial expansion continued to shape central bank policy (Uche 1997). 
In 1992, the IMF and the Nigerian government abandoned the SAP. What accounts for the 
failed SAP? One factor appears to be pressure to consolidate power by placating domestic 
political interests through expansionary economic policy (Lewis and Stein 1997, p. 12). The 
SAP had been met with mass rioting and unrelenting criticism from most groups within 
Nigerian society. Babangida’s regime, however, wanted to increase its popular support and 
political stability, partly because it had, in parallel to the SAP, initiated a process of transition 
to civilian rule and had scheduled presidential elections, which after several deferrals, were held 
in 1993.  
Another factor appears to be that access to replacement resources in the form of oil revenues 
increased over the course of the SAP. As Figure 1 shows, oil revenues increased steadily from 
1986 and, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Nigeria experienced an oil windfall 
which lasted until 1991. The access to oil revenues reduced the influence the IMF and private 
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creditors had gained over policy through their influence on debt rescheduling (Herbst and 
Soludo 2001, pp. 671-3).  
When General Sani Abacha came to power through a military coup in 1993, the expansionary 
policy stance initially continued. Abacha had overthrown an interim government that 
Babangida had appointed to succeed him following his annulment of the 1993 presidential 
elections. At that time oil revenues were still considerable and financiers were unable to 
influence policy through withholding capital or political mobilization when their economic 
interests were violated. For example, large businesses and banks, which had organised 
themselves under the umbrella of the Nigerian Economic Summit Group (NESG), lobbied 
Abacha’s government extensively in 1993 to promote price stability and to rely more on market 
mechanisms, including by deregulating interest rates (Kraus 2002, p. 423, Nigerian Economic 
Summit 1993). Yet despite these efforts to exercise instrumental power CBN policies remained 
expansionary in 1993 and the government reversed core elements of the SAP, re-establishing 
for instance interest rate ceilings (Lewis and Stein 1997, p. 15).  
Shrinking capacity to diverge from the preferences of financiers after the boom, 1994-1998  
When oil revenues declined heavily from 1994 onwards, the policy space of Abacha’s 
government declined as well. Lacking the access to replacement resources, Abacha’s regime 
decided to show some responsiveness to financiers’ concerns by orienting expansionary 
policies more towards stability. In particular, the government and CBN sought to enhance 
stability in the distressed banking sector by introducing stringent anti-fraud legislation in 1994 
and resolving failing banks (Brownbridge 1998, p. 120). In addition, the CBN tightened 
monetary policy and raised interest rate ceilings in 1995, displaying greater responsiveness to 
the demands of the NESG and IFIs to rely on market mechanisms and promote economic 
stability (IMF 1998, pp. 6-7, Lewis 2009, p. 176). Regulators were also given some de facto 
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operational autonomy to enhance macroeconomic stability (Interview with financial regulator, 
20 September 2017).  
However, as Abacha’s government failed to pursue a comprehensive programme of structural 
reform, the IMF and banks continued to withhold financing. In particular, debt rescheduling 
remained on hold and credit extended by commercial banks to the private sector fell from 13% 
of GDP in 1993 to 8% of GDP in 1996 (World Bank 2013a).When Olusegun Obasanjo came 
to power after elections in 1999, a year after Abacha’s death, he inherited a weak economy. 
High oil revenues and political space for expansionary policy, 1999-2013 
Obasanjo was convinced that, after decades of military rule, multiparty democracy could only 
be cemented if standards of living increased (The Economist 2000). The government’s strategy 
to raise living standards was based on two cornerstones: First, raising levels of private 
investment in the non-oil sectors to reduce Nigeria’s vulnerability to changes in oil revenues 
(NNPC 2004). Second, securing debt relief, which the government considered imperative to 
free up government resources for public investment (Obasanjo 2003). In 1999 servicing of 
external debt amounted to 9 per cent of Nigeria’s exports (World Bank 2013b) and a sizable 
share of government revenue even though oil prices rose in the early 2000s. 
Obasanjo did not secure debt relief during his first term even though it was a political priority. 
His administration agreed on an IMF Stand-By Arrangement without borrowing from the IMF 
in 2000 as creditors made debt relief conditional on the IMF’s stamp of approval of Nigeria’s 
economic policies. However, from late 2000 onwards, the government and CBN pursued 
expansionary policies, alienating the IMF and foreign creditors. Specifically, the government 
massively increased expenditures against the backdrop of buoyant oil revenues. Instead of 
fighting inflationary pressures, the CBN maintained low interest rates to facilitate access to 
credit for the non-oil sectors (IMF 2001, 2004). The IMF urged policymakers to orient policy 
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towards stability (IMF 2003), but lacked the power to enforce change. The Nigerian authorities 
were aware that expansionary policy would violate the monetary targets agreed with the IMF. 
Yet the government was willing to pay this price to stimulate the economy before elections in 
2003 and could afford to pay it because high oil revenues had reduced reliance on the IMF and 
the debt service  burden (Wallis 2002, DMO 2004, p. 14). As a result, the IMF resorted to its 
only disciplinary measure: It suspended its programme with Nigeria, which had been the 
precondition for debt relief. 
Once Obasanjo had won another term of office in 2003 the government worked again towards 
an IMF-backed reform programme because it considered it a precondition to achieve its goal of 
economic expansion (Okonjo-Iweala 2007). According to Obasanjo (2003, pp. 5-6) servicing 
debt fully ‘would mean that little or no capital expenditure for health, education and 
infrastructure, could be financed and hence, growth would be jeopardized. (…) Nigeria's debt 
overhang is serious and unsustainable. It constitutes a deterrent to private sector investment and 
to growth and development.’ The government exploited the space created by high oil revenues 
strategically. It designed a reform programme which was formally monitored by the IMF but, 
to guard financial independence, not supported by an IMF loan (Okonjo-Iweala 2007, pp. 5-6). 
Moreover, the government used oil revenues to buy off political constituencies and increase 
social expenditure while exercising fiscal and monetary restraint (Utomi et al. 2007, Callaghy 
2009, p. 35). Nigeria earned recognition from the IMF for maintaining macroeconomic stability 
in an environment of high oil revenues in 2005 (IMF 2005, 2006), paving the way for debt relief 
from official creditors in the Paris Club in 2005 and from commercial creditors in the London 
Club in 2007. While this episode is consistent with the claim that governments in resource 
dependent developing countries prefer expansionary policy it also shows that policymakers do 
not automatically pursue an expansionary policy in a context of high resource revenues but that 
there is room for agency. Nigerian policymakers decided to pay the price of short-term restraint 
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to facilitate expansionary policy in the longer term and exploited the space provided by oil 
revenues to employ policies which helped them to raise investment and stay in power.  
With debt relief efforts on track the government turned to raising non-oil investment. 
Obasanjo’s economic team considered financial reform central to raising investment because 
many Nigerian banks were fragile, preferred lending to the government given its oil revenues 
and had become reliant on public sector deposits instead of mobilising public savings (NNPC 
2004, pp. 24, 75, Soludo 2004). Therefore, Charles Soludo, a key member of Obasanjo’s 
economic team since 2003, designed a banking reform agenda when he became CBN governor 
in 2004. The centrepiece of the agenda was the consolidation of the banking sector through an 
increase of the minimum capital requirement for banks from about US$15 million to US$190 
million, which was envisaged to be achieved through mergers and acquisitions. Soludo (2004) 
argued that the consolidation would improve access to finance for entrepreneurs and create 
internationally competitive banks that would mobilise international capital to support domestic 
investment.  
The CBN was indifferent to financiers’ concerns. Most banks complained loudly about the 
reform because it would force them to close down the business or merge with other banks. Yet 
they were ultimately powerless because they provided only a limited share of resources for 
investment in Nigeria and were financially dependent on the government’s oil revenues. Their 
contribution to the economy was, as a senior government official (Interview, 11 November 
2010) explained, limited because most banks ‘would be insolvent if they did not have the 
government as a client, as borrower or depositor’. Limited financial reliance on these banks and 
central bank independence – which was formally enhanced in 2007 and de facto high due to 
Obasanjo’s backing of Soludo – enhanced the CBN’s political space for the reform. The IMF 
did not speak out against the consolidation but raised concerns about its potential impact on 
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banking sector stability (IMF 2005). Yet, as a senior IMF official (Interview, 8 September 2017) 
recalls, ‘we were not listened to; we anyways were not asked.’ 
The banking sector consolidation epitomises the trade-offs between stability and expanding 
access to finance. It reduced the number of Nigerian banks from 89 to 25 and contributed to the 
desired credit growth. Yet the CBN failed to ensure the quality of the capital of merged 
institutions and to tighten supervision. The global financial crisis that began in 2008 magnified 
the risks in the Nigerian banking system, producing a full-blown financial crisis. In 2009, 10 
out of Nigeria’s 25 banks, accounting for about a third of banking system assets, were either 
insolvent or undercapitalised.  
Under Lamido Sanusi, who succeeded Soludo when his term as CBN governor ended in 2009, 
the CBN used its formal and de facto independence to restore financial stability while 
expanding access to finance. Notably, the CBN rescued the failing banks, replaced some bank 
managers and tightened prudential regulation. The CBN did not care that some bankers 
complained loudly that the CBN’s measures were ‘aggressive’ and Sanusi was ‘acting with a 
sense of impunity’ (Interview with a banker, 4 November 2010). At the same time, an increase 
in the state’s oil revenues from 2010 onwards also enhanced the CBN’s capacity for 
expansionary policy. Monetary policy became oriented towards both price stability and 
ensuring low interest rates to encourage bank lending to the private sector (IMF 2011, p. 9). 
Moreover, the CBN used moral suasion to exercise pressure on banks to lend to the real 
economy and massively expanded its subsidised credit schemes. Sanusi (2010) and his staff 
believed that the role of the central bank in a developing, undiversified economy like Nigeria 
went beyond promoting stability and included increasing flow of funds into productive 
investment.  
Deliberate efforts by financiers to change the policy stance were unsuccessful. According to 
one banker (Interview, 3 February 2012) ‘they meet with us, discuss their plans but in the end, 
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they do not take up our suggestions.’ Moreover, banks opposed the CBN’s subsidised credit 
schemes because in their view the CBN passed risks on to banks and the associated margins 
were too small because the CBN had capped the interest rates for on-lending (Interviews with 
IFI officials, September 2017). The central bankers were not concerned about banks’ ability to 
withhold investible funds in response to their policies because in their view, the contribution of 
the banks to economic development had been minimal since they focused on lending to the oil 
industry (Interviews with CBN officials, January 2012 and September 2017) and high banking 
sector liquidity had led to unproductive activities like speculation in commodities markets (FT 
2009, Sanusi 2010). The IMF also criticised the CBN’s efforts to stimulate lending through 
expansionary monetary policy and subsidised credit and urged the CBN to focus on ensuring 
price and financial stability (IMF 2011). Yet as high oil revenues had reduced Nigeria’s reliance 
on financiers, they, once again, lacked the power to influence policy. As one MPC member 
(Interview, 4 February 2012) put it, ‘we hear what the IMF says but we do not need to do what 
it says.’12-13 
Conclusion 
Nigeria’s story illustrates that state access to resource revenues may enhance the capacity of 
the state to diverge from financiers’ preferred central bank policies. The lower the resource 
revenues of the Nigerian state, the lower was its capacity to diverge from financiers’ preferences 
for a policy stance prioritising stability and to advance its preferences for a stance that 
prioritised an expansion of access to finance. As resource revenues increased, the state’s 
capacity to diverge from financiers’ preferred central bank policies and to advance its own 
preferences increased as well. Especially in periods of high oil revenues financiers resorted to 
the deliberate use of political resources such as lobbying to influence policy, as did for instance 
the NESG in the early 1990s. The effectiveness of efforts to exercise instrumental power was, 
however, limited when the state did not rely on financiers’ funds.  
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The quality of political institutions can hardly account for the pattern of central bank policy. 
There was a limited correspondence between periods of high central bank independence and 
the prioritisation of monetary and financial stability; nor were more democratic regimes, like 
the regimes of Shagari and Obasanjo, more likely to employ a central bank policy stance that 
was responsive to financiers. Similarly, changes in political leadership and key personnel such 
as central bank governors were not systematically associated with changes in the direction of 
central bank policy. In fact, central bank policy changed remarkably while Babangida, Abacha 
and Obasanjo were in power. Nigeria’s story also lends only limited support to the argument 
that financial distress in the banking sector helps to account for the diminished influence of 
financial institutions. The state’s responsiveness to bankers was limited during periods of high 
revenues even when the banking sector was stable. The claim that the IMF’s influence over 
policy reform declines when it fails to sanction unresponsive behaviour does also not 
satisfactorily explain Nigeria’s pattern of central bank policy because programmes were 
suspended when conditionality was not met.  
In sum, Nigeria’s case suggests that enhancing central bank independence, democracy, changes 
in leadership, banking sector soundness and IMF sanctions for violations of conditionality are 
unlikely to help maintaining an orientation of central bank policy towards stability during 
resource booms because policy has deep, structural roots. That is not to say that shifts in 
structural power are the only factor shaping Nigeria’s central bank policy. Electoral incentives, 
for instance, were an additional important consideration for policymakers. However, access to 
resource revenues was a central enabling factor for the pursuit of popular expansionary policy. 
The analysis pursued in this article contributes to explaining the finding of previous work that 
resource dependent countries are likely to employ expansionary fiscal and monetary policy 
during resource booms (Kaufman 2011) by pointing to structural power as the causal 
mechanism linking state access to resource revenues and the capacity of the state to employ 
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expansionary policy during resource booms. The Nigerian government felt considerable 
pressures to raise investment to maintain political support and finance the state apparatus. When 
oil revenues increased, vulnerability to financiers’ threats to withhold investible resources 
decreased, increasing not only the fiscal space but also the political space to pursue policies that 
violated the preferences of financiers.  
Ultimately, this article contributes to the literature on structural power by advancing a still 
recent agenda on the variability of the power of financiers in developing countries. While 
resource booms and thus the space for expansionary, statist policy may be short-lived, 
institutions are sticky and may also survive busts, as the continued existence of the CBN’s 
development finance department underscores. Future work could contribute to the emerging 
literature on the policies that improve development outcomes in resource dependent developing 
countries (Kolstad and Wiig 2009, Morrison 2012, Mosley 2017) by examining the conditions 
under which the space in central bank policy is used in ways that enhance development 
outcomes. Moreover, there is significant scope for research that explores whether access to 
state-controlled funds other than resource revenues, for instance revenues from state-owned 
enterprises, has similar effects on policy autonomy in developing countries. Shedding light on 
forces countervailing financial interests is also relevant for policy because it demonstrates that 
‘structural’ does not mean ‘inevitable’.  
1 See for instance Maxfield (1990) Mosley (2003, 2005) and Campello (2014), 
2 I use the term ‘natural resources’ to refer to point-source non-renewable resources such as oil. 
3 See for instance Maxfield (1990), Andrews (1994), Cohen (1996) and Campello (2014), 
4 See for instance Lukauskas and Minushkin (2000), Bird and Rowlands (2002), Joyce and 
Noy (2008) and Dafe (2017). 
5 The literature provides several explanations for the alignment of interests between the IMF 
and private financial institutions such as: IMF staffs’ professional training in Anglo-American 




economics departments emphasising market-based economic governance (Babb 2003, Woods 
2006, Chwieroth 2010); the dependence of the IMF on supplementary financing from private 
institutions in its programmes (Gould 2003); and the ability of powerful member states as major 
shareholders to shape IMF policies in ways that advance the interests of their domestic banks 
(Wade and Veneroso 1998, Oatley and Yackee 2004, Breen 2014).   
6 Institutions like sovereign wealth funds may help to reign in expansionary policies. 
However, the decision to set up a sovereign wealth fund is endogenous and, as also Nigeria’s 
case confirms, few resource dependent developing countries have effectively managed these 
funds (Chwieroth 2014).   
7 This argument is in line with evidence that states with a high level of oil income are more 
likely to employ interventionist financial policies (Mazaheri 2014) and expansionary 
monetary policy (Kaufman 2011). 
8 The interview data mainly relates to the period from 2000 onwards because most key 
informants involved in designing policy, advising or negotiating with policymakers only took 
up their positions after Nigeria’s transition to democracy and because there has been a 
generational change in key personnel. 
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